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Abstract—Trigger-Action platforms are an emerging class of
web-based systems that enable users to create automation rules
(or recipes) of the form, “If there is a smoke alarm, then turn
off my oven.” These platforms stitch together various online
services including Internet of Things devices, social networks,
and productivity tools by obtaining OAuth tokens on behalf of
users. Unfortunately, these platforms also introduce a long-term
security risk: If they are compromised, the attacker can misuse
the OAuth tokens belonging to millions of users to arbitrarily
manipulate their devices and data. In this work, we first quantify
the risk users face in the context of If-This-Then-That (IFTTT),
a popular trigger-action platform that interfaces with 297 online
services and provides over 200, 000 recipes. We perform the first
empirical analysis of the OAuth-based authorization model of
IFTTT using semi-automated tools that we built to overcome the
challenges of IFTTT’s closed source nature and of online service
API inconsistencies. We find that 75% of IFTTT’s channels, an
abstraction of online services, use overprivileged OAuth tokens,
increasing risks in the event of a compromise. Even if the OAuth
tokens were to be privileged correctly, IFTTT’s compromise will
not prevent their misuse. Motivated by this empirical analysis,
we design, build, and evaluate Decoupled-IFTTT (dIFTTT), the
first trigger-action platform where users do not have to give it
highly-privileged access to their online services. dIFTTT splits
the logically monolithic IFTTT architecture into a cloud service
that users do not trust, and a set of clients. A user only has
to trust the client she installs. Our design pushes the notion of
fine-grained OAuth tokens to its extreme and ensures that even
if the cloud service is controlled by the attacker, it cannot misuse
the OAuth tokens to invoke unauthorized actions. Using such
fine-grained tokens would normally lead to a drastic increase in
the number of OAuth permission prompts. dIFTTT avoids this
increase by introducing the concept of a Transfer Token (XToken)
and combining it with recipe-specific tokens. Our evaluation
establishes that dIFTTT poses modest overhead: it adds less than
15ms of latency to recipe execution time, and reduces throughput
by 2.5%.
I. INTRODUCTION
Trigger-Action platforms are a class of web-based systems
that stitch together several online services to provide users the
ability to set up automation rules. These platforms allow users
to setup rules like, “If I post a picture to Instagram, save the
picture to my Dropbox account.” The ease of use and function-
ality of such platforms have made them increasingly popular,
and several of them (e.g., If-This-Then-That [5], Zapier [12],
and Microsoft Flow [3]) are on the rise. Furthermore, with
the rise in popularity of connected physical devices like smart
locks and ovens, we observe that many trigger-action platforms
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have started adding automation support for physical devices,
making it possible for users to set up rules like: “If there is
a smoke alarm, then turn off my oven” [15]. These platforms
have privileged access to a user’s online services and physical
devices. If they are compromised, then attackers can arbitrarily
manipulate data and devices belonging to a large number of
users to cause damage.
We quantify the risk users face if a trigger-action platform
is compromised by performing the first empirical analysis of
IFTTT’s authorization model—a cloud-based closed source
system that provides a trigger-action abstraction for end-
users in the form of recipes.1 Running our example recipe
above requires IFTTT to integrate with the smoke alarm
(Nest) and the oven and obtain authorization to access them
on the user’s behalf. It achieves this integration using its
channel abstraction [5], through which IFTTT gains privileged
access to the user’s accounts on online services that in turn
provide access to the smoke alarm and the oven. IFTTT and
online services decide the privilege using the popular OAuth
protocol [23], [24], where IFTTT requests a certain amount
of privilege using the scope parameter, and gains OAuth
tokens if users grant privilege. Therefore, IFTTT contains
OAuth tokens for all user online services in its logically
monolithic architecture [4]. If IFTTT is compromised, then the
attacker can misuse the tokens and arbitrarily manipulate data
and devices. Furthermore, incorrect OAuth scoping can lead
to overprivilege—either IFTTT channels may request broad
scopes or the online services may only offer coarse-grained
scopes. In either case, if IFTTT is compromised, the highly-
privileged OAuth tokens will only increase the damage that
attackers can cause.
We choose to study IFTTT for several reasons. First, it is
a popular platform, supporting 297 channels as of April 14th,
2016, and offers more than 200, 000 recipes, many created
by end-users [36]. Second, its trigger-action programming
abstraction is well-suited to many desirable home automation
behaviors [37], and it supports 80 cyber-physical channels.
Third, IFTTT is representative of a larger class of trigger-action
platforms. Other systems such as Zapier [12] and Microsoft
Flow [3] share the same design principles. Therefore, the
results and lessons we learn from our empirical study of IFTTT
are broadly applicable to the security design of other systems
in this class.
Performing this empirical analysis is challenging for sev-
1On Nov 2nd, IFTTT changed some of its naming conventions. e.g.,
Recipe → Applet, Channel → Service. These changes do not affect
the functionality of IFTTT or our results. https://ifttt.com/m/meet-the-new-ifttt
provides a full description of these changes.
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eral reasons. First, IFTTT is closed source—we cannot inspect
source code or even binary code to determine what scopes the
channels need or request. Second, many channels use a specific
opaque scope=ifttt OAuth authorization URL parameter,
defined by the online service for the channel, and that does
not reveal the APIs that the channel can access. Third, there is
no defined scope-to-API mapping in the OAuth specification,
making it difficult to compute the set of online service APIs
to which a scoped token gives access. Fourth, online services
do not document their APIs in consistent ways and do not
provide unit tests, making large scale testing difficult. We
built a semi-automated measurement pipeline that overcame
the above challenges to obtain tokens of the same privilege that
IFTTT uses and then exhaustively tested online service APIs
to compute a conservative lower bound on the overprivilege
that IFTTT channels exhibit. Our results indicate that 75% of
the channels examined have access to more operations than
they need to support their triggers and actions.
The presence of such tokens makes IFTTT an attractive
target for attackers and increases risks if it is compromised.
For example, our empirical analysis shows that an attacker can
reprogram Particle chips and delete Google Drive files with a
single HTTP call (§III-D). Thus, users are taking a significant
long-term risk in granting IFTTT highly-privileged access to
their online data and devices.
We show that this risk can be avoided, while getting the
benefits of a cloud-based trigger-action platform. We design,
implement, and evaluate Decoupled-IFTTT (dIFTTT), the first
decoupled trigger-action platform whose compromise does not
permit an attacker to arbitrarily invoke functions in online
services. dIFTTT achieves this property by introducing the
notion of recipe-specific tokens. A recipe-specific token can
only be used to execute the specified recipe. If a compromised
cloud service attempts to use a token to invoke an action
without a valid trigger, the online service will deny that
request. Thus dIFTTT ensures that the cloud service: (1) can
only invoke actions and triggers needed for the recipes it is
executing; (2) can invoke actions only if it can prove to an
action service that the corresponding trigger occurred in the
past within a reasonable amount of time; and (3) cannot tamper
with any trigger data passing through it undetected.
Unless carefully designed, recipe-specific tokens can lead
to an increased number of OAuth permission prompts because
users would have to login and approve an OAuth scope request
every time they create a recipe. The challenge is to gain
the security of recipe-specific tokens but maintain the current
IFTTT experience where users login to channels only once
during a setup phase. dIFTTT overcomes this challenge by
introducing the concept of transfer tokens (XTokens). A client
uses an XToken to automatically obtain a recipe-specific token,
which it transmits to the cloud service for recipe execution.
dIFTTT requires the untrusted cloud service to prove to
the invoked action service that a trigger has occurred within
a reasonable amount of time in the past. As the cloud service
can be compromised, a possible design is to have the trigger
service communicate directly with the action service to verify
the occurrence of a triggering event. However, this introduces
an undesirable dependency between the action and trigger ser-
vices. dIFTTT avoids that by using a lightweight cryptographic
signature-based extension to the OAuth 2.0 protocol.
Our Contributions:
• We perform an empirical analysis of IFTTT’s authoriza-
tion model to quantify the risk that users face in the event
that it is compromised:
◦ Based on an analysis of authorization sessions of 128
online services that IFTTT integrates with, we charac-
terize: (1) the descriptiveness of OAuth scope requests
(§II, §III), and (2) the level of control these services
provide to users when IFTTT requests scopes. Our
analysis reveals that most online services (101/128)
provide a good or acceptable explanation of the scopes
being requested. Unfortunately, for many online ser-
vices (122/128), a user is only given an all-or-nothing
choice of accepting all scope requests or none at all.
Therefore, for most online services, even though users
are told what level of access is being requested, they
are not provided the means to restrict the amount of
privilege they grant to IFTTT.
◦ We find that 107/128 channels use an opaque scope
that the online service provides, such as generic,
null, or ifttt. This can lead to overprivilege.
Therefore, we perform an in-depth analysis of the over-
privilege of all externally measurable IFTTT channels
(69 of them) and obtain a conservative lower bound.
We study all 941 APIs across 24 channels, including
16 higher-risk cyber-physical channels, and find that
18 channels including 10 cyber-physical channels have
access to APIs that they do not need to implement
their functionality. Our analysis covers 80.4% of all
recipes involved in the set of 69 channels (§III-D). Ex-
amples of overprivileged channels include well-known
services like Facebook, Twitter, and Google Drive and
cyber-physical services like Particle, and MyFox Home
Control. Using such overprivileged access, a potentially
compromised IFTTT platform can reprogram a Particle
chip’s firmware or delete files on Google Drive arbi-
trarily with a single single HTTP call.
• Motivated by this empirical analysis, we designed and im-
plemented Decoupled-IFTTT, the first decoupled trigger-
action platform where users do not have to trust the
platform with highly-privileged access to their online
services (§V). dIFTTT splits the logically monolithic
IFTTT architecture into an untrusted cloud service that
executes recipes at scale, and a set of clients that help
users create recipes in a secure manner. dIFTTT is based
on cryptographic extensions to the OAuth protocol that
only allow the cloud service to execute user recipes,
even if it is attacker-controlled. Our design introduces
techniques that enable trigger-action functionality without
putting users at risk of attackers arbitrarily manipulating
data and devices. Recipe-specific tokens also reduce the
platform’s liability in the event of a compromise.
◦ Our evaluation of dIFTTT shows that performance
overhead is modest (§VI): Each recipe requires less
than 3.5KB additional storage space and imposes less
than 7.5KB of transmission overhead per execution.
◦ dIFTTT adds less than 15ms of latency to recipe execu-
tion time. For recipes on IFTTT, which typically send
emails, SMSs, or invoke actions on physical devices
or on online services over a network, we consider this
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additional latency to be acceptable. dIFTTT reduces
throughput by 2.5% for recipe execution.
Although dIFTTT requires online services to support
recipe-specific tokens and to use cryptographic extensions to
the OAuth 2.0 protocol, there are several options to help
developers make the transition. One option that we followed
in our implementation is to design a library that only requires
adding a single annotation above HTTP methods in the server
(§VI). Another option is to construct a trusted proxy for
the online services (§VII). Furthermore, as these platforms
are still emerging, our design gives system implementers an
opportunity to construct secure trigger-action platforms from
the ground up, and represents an important first step towards
securing trigger-action platforms.
II. IF-THIS-THEN-THAT
IFTTT is a popular trigger-action platform that makes
it easy for end-users to set up interactions between various
online services and IoT devices to achieve useful automation.
IFTTT works by communicating with the REST APIs that
these services expose. Figure 1 shows the high-level IFTTT ar-
chitecture. It has the following four architectural components:
• Channel: A channel represents part of an online service’s
set of APIs on the IFTTT platform. Users connect chan-
nels to their IFTTT accounts—a process that involves
user authorization. For example, a user with a Facebook
account must authorize the IFTTT Facebook channel to
communicate with the corresponding Facebook account.
Channels communicate with online services using REST
(Representational State Transfer) APIs operating over
HTTP(S). These online services use the popular OAuth
protocol to enforce authorization [23], [24]. Users must
connect several such channels, before they can accomplish
any useful work. Either IFTTT developers or service
providers can implement channels. In the latter case,
IFTTT exposes a separate API to channel writers to help
them integrate their online service with IFTTT.2
• Trigger: A channel may provide triggers, which are
events that occur in the associated online service. “A file
was uploaded to a cloud drive” or “smoke alarm is on”
are examples of triggers.
• Action: A channel may also provide actions. An action
is a function (or set of functions) that exists in the API of
the online service. Examples of actions include “turning
on or off a connected oven” or “sending an SMS.”
• Recipe: Recipes are at the core of the IFTTT user expe-
rience, and they are the core functionality that IFTTT en-
ables. A recipe stitches together two channels to achieve
useful automation. It has two pieces. The “If” piece
represents a trigger or an event that occurs on an online
service. The “Then” piece represents an action that should
be executed on the online service. For example, “If
there is a smoke alarm, then turn off my oven.” This
recipe integrates the smoke alarm channel’s “alarm is
on” trigger with the oven channel’s “turn off the oven”
action. Although IFTTT only permits a single trigger and
a single action in a recipe, other trigger-action platforms
offer multiple triggers and actions in the same recipe.
2This API is currently in private beta [21].
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Fig. 1: An overview of IFTTT architecture in the context of
a recipe. Online services have a channel inside IFTTT. These
channels gain access to online service APIs by acquiring an
OAuth token during the channel connection step. A recipe
combines a trigger and an action.
There is a one-to-one correspondence between online ser-
vices and IFTTT channels. For example, the Google Drive
online service corresponds to the Google Drive IFTTT channel.
IFTTT has 297 channels as of April 14th, 2016.
Authorization Model. Online services protect their REST
APIs using authorization protocols. OAuth is a popular choice
that enables an online service to provide third parties with
secure delegated access to its APIs. IFTTT must obtain autho-
rization to communicate with online services that its channels
represent; and therefore it must follow the OAuth authorization
workflow. Figure 2 shows the IFTTT authorization model. It
has four steps.
First, a channel developer (IFTTT or the online service
provider itself) must create a client application for the online
service’s REST API. This client application represents an
IFTTT channel on the online service. During the sign-up phase,
the online service assigns a client ID and a secret that IFTTT
uses during the authorization workflow.
Second, a user initiates a channel connection within the
IFTTT administrative interface and this causes IFTTT to initi-
ate the OAuth 2.0 authorization code flow—the recommended
workflow for server-to-server authorization—that results in
IFTTT requesting the corresponding online service for a short
authorization code on behalf of the user. IFTTT passes a
client identifier value, a redirect URI, and a scope value as
part of the HTTP(S) request. The scope value represents the
level of access IFTTT is requesting to operate a channel. This
authorization request results in the user being presented with an
OAuth permissions screen that explains the scope that IFTTT
is requesting. As the OAuth protocol does not specify the
design of the permissions screen, the screen design, scope
explanations, and UI options to modify the requested scopes
is at the discretion of the online service.
Third, assuming the user accepts the scope request, the
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Fig. 2: IFTTT’s authorization model has four phases. Channel
developers create client applications for the online service
that results in the online service assigning a client ID and
secret to the application. Then, IFTTT initiates an authorization
workflow. The OAuth 2.0 authorization code flow is a popular
choice, and it results in IFTTT gaining a scoped bearer token
that authorizes a channel to invoke APIs on an online service.
Users are prompted to approve or deny scope requests during
this process.
online service redirects to the IFTTT-provided redirect URI
with a short authorization code as an argument. Fourth, IFTTT
exchanges the authorization code, client ID, and client secret
for an access token using server-to-server communication.
Finally, IFTTT can then use the OAuth bearer token to initiate
API calls on the online service to implement channel functions.
Although OAuth 2.0 is by far the most popular authoriza-
tion protocol that IFTTT uses, there are online services that
use OAuth 1.0a. This protocol does not have explicit scoping
as part of the authorization workflow, but a similar concept
is available when a client application signs up for the online
service’s API. During the client application sign-up phase, the
developer can choose scopes to enable. For example, Twitter
uses OAuth 1.0a, and it provides a settings item that allows a
developer to change the access level of the client application,
and hence, change the scope of any tokens issued in the future.
A. Potential for Overprivilege
Ideally, IFTTT should be authorized with only enough
privilege to run a given user’s set of recipes. Any access rights
beyond what it requires to run a user’s recipes is overprivileged
access. Based on the authorization model and IFTTT architec-
ture discussion above, we observe the potential for two kinds
of systemic overprivilege that stems from IFTTT’s design. We
discuss them below.
Recipe-Channel Overprivilege. An IFTTT recipe only re-
quires a single trigger and a single action. However, one chan-
Channel Triggers Actions
Particle
New event published. Publish an event.Monitor a variable.
Monitor a function result. Call a function.Monitor your device status.
Google Drive NONE
Upload file from UR.L
Create a document.
Append to a document.
Add row to spreadsheet
TABLE I: Triggers and Actions for the Particle and Google
Drive Channels.
nel can support multiple triggers and actions. Table I shows the
set of triggers and actions for two example channels—Particle
and Google Drive. Therefore, if a user adds a recipe that uses
a subset of triggers and actions of the associated channels,
all additional triggers and actions that the channel implements
is overprivileged access. That is, IFTTT acquires the right to
invoke online service APIs that it does not need for executing
the recipes of a given user. This kind of overprivilege stems
from the IFTTT design choice that channel authorization is
not recipe-specific.
Channel-Online-Service Overprivilege. The second type of
overprivilege we observe is related to the authorization be-
tween IFTTT and an online service. As discussed, IFTTT
provides channels that have trigger and action functionality.
Furthermore, IFTTT must request authorization to a set of
online service APIs to implement a channel’s functionality.
Ideally, the IFTTT channel should only have the authorization
needed to implement its functionality. However, in practice,
incorrect scoping can lead to IFTTT gaining authorization to
access APIs it does not need to implement its trigger and
action functionality. This can occur if the online service does
not provide granular scopes, forcing IFTTT to request coarse-
grained overprivileged access. This can also occur if IFTTT
incorrectly requests overprivileged access even if the online
service provides fine-grained scopes.
B. Examples of Overprivilege
Here we show the potential for the two types of overpriv-
ilege discussed above using two case studies.
Particle. This is a DIY electronics platform that offers small
form-factor chips with a microcontroller, memory, and an
Internet connection. Particle supports writing custom firmware
for its chips and exposes a REST API to make the chips
remotely accessible. IFTTT supports the Particle channel.
Table I shows the set of triggers and actions for this channel. If
a user’s recipes do not use all the triggers and actions, then that
channel exhibits recipe-channel overprivilege. Figure 3 shows
the OAuth permissions screen a user sees while connecting the
Particle channel to IFTTT. Clearly, the channel is requesting
privilege to “reprogram” a Particle device. However, based on
the triggers and actions from Table I, the channel does not offer
any such operation in recipes, and hence exhibits channel-
online-service overprivilege. If IFTTT is compromised, an
attacker can use this level of access to reprogram a chip even
though there are no channel operations and no recipes that
offer such functionality.
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Fig. 3: Particle OAuth permissions prompt. This indicates that
the IFTTT Particle channel will have the ability to reprogram
a Particle chip even when there are no triggers or actions that
support such functionality, leading to overprivileged access for
the channel.
Google Drive. This is a well-known online service that offers
cloud storage for various types of files. Similar to Particle,
if a user’s Google Drive recipes do not use all the triggers
and actions of the corresponding IFTTT channel (see Table I),
then that channel exhibits recipe-channel overprivilege. Fig-
ure 4 shows the OAuth permissions screen a user sees while
connecting the Google Drive channel to IFTTT. The prompt
indicates that IFTTT will be able to “View and manage the
files in your Google Drive.” Based on Google Drive API
documentation, this implies the ability to “Upload, download,
update, and delete files in your Google Drive.” However, the
Google Drive channel does not offer any triggers or actions
that delete files. Thus we conclude that the IFTTT Google
Drive channel exhibits channel-online-service overprivilege.
Therefore, based on these case studies, we observe the
potential for overprivilege in terms of recipes operating with
channels and in terms of channels interfacing with the online
service APIs. We focus our empirical overprivilege analysis on
these two types of overprivilege.
III. EMPIRICAL OVERPRIVILEGE ANALYSIS OF IFTTT
We studied 297 channels, covering 219, 284 recipes and
performed an in-depth overprivilege computation for 24 chan-
nels, including 16 cyber-physical channels, achieving a cover-
age of 80.4% of all recipes involved in a set of 69 channels
that can be studied in-depth. Our findings are two-fold. First,
based on an analysis of the triggers and actions supported
by 297 channels, we found that on average, each channel
has 3.5 triggers and 2 actions. As a recipe only needs one
trigger and one action, if a user’s set of recipes do not
use all channel triggers/actions, then there is overprivilege.
Second, we find that 18 (out of 24) channels have access to
online service APIs that they do not need to implement their
trigger/action functionality. We present details on our dataset
and how we constructed it, and we present our semi-automated
overprivilege measurement pipeline, along with details on its
output.
A. Dataset and Measurement Setup
There are two parts to our dataset: recipes and channels.
We used the recipe dataset from Ur et al. [36] that contains
Fig. 4: Google Drive OAuth permissions prompt. “View and
manage the files in your Google Drive” implies the ability to
“Upload, download, update, and delete files in your Google
Drive” as per Google Drive API documentation. This is over-
privileged access since no triggers and actions of the channel
allow deleting files.
219,284 recipes (after filtering out recipes that refer to defunct
channels), and we created our own dataset of 297 channels that
consists of trigger and action details. We created this dataset
of channels on April 14th, 2016. We also scraped the IFTTT
website to download trigger and action details (description,
input arguments) for all channels of the dataset.
Subsequently, we created a test IFTTT account and an
account for each online service. We then manually connected
each channel by following the OAuth workflow. We were able
to connect 170 channels to our test IFTTT account, out of
which, we recorded authorization sessions for 128 channels.
An authorization session consists of two items: (1) The OAuth
authorization URL that IFTTT uses to initiate authorization
with the online service to receive a token, and (2) A screenshot
of the OAuth permissions prompt. We were unable to connect
or record authorization sessions for 169 channels due to the
following reasons:
• Channels that are connected by default or do not
require authorization: Channels such as SMS, weather,
and ESPN that are not tied to any 3rd party user account
fall in this category. We observed 40 such channels among
297 in our study. We exclude these channels from further
analysis.
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Status Authorized Req.Device
Mobile
App
Only
No
Auth. Pay-Wall Other
Channels 128 57 33 40 10 29
TABLE II: Channel connection status. We were able to record
authorization session information for 43% of all channels in
our dataset. 19% of channels require a physical device to be
present during connection, 11% gain authorization through
a mobile app’s native permission model, 19% of channels
connect without requiring authorization, 3% sit behind a pay-
wall and could not be connected, and 10% were either defunct
or malfunctioning at the time of our analysis.
• Channels that require specific physical devices for
connection or are behind a pay-wall: Channels such
as Feedly and D-Link Siren that require either purchasing
a physical device or purchasing a subscription to complete
the connection to IFTTT fall in this category. We observed
67 such channels. To minimize the cost of our research
project, we exclude them from further analysis. We note
that we include channels with physical devices in our
analysis if they could be connected to our test IFTTT
account without a physical device being present. We also
include the Alexa and SmartThings channels for which
we purchased physical devices.
• Channels that are mobile only and communicate only
through IFTTT mobile app: Channels such as iOS
Contacts and Android Location that only operate on a
mobile platform such as Android and iOS fall in this
category. We observed 33 such channels. These channels
rely on the permission architecture of the underlying
mobile platform and do not use OAuth. Therefore, we
exclude them from further analysis.
• Defunct or Malfunctioning Channels: Channels such
as Home8 and iSmartAlarm that were either defunct or
malfunctioning during the connection process fall in this
category. We observe 29 such channels, which we exclude
from further analysis.
Table II presents a breakdown of the connection status of
our 297 channels. We focus the rest of our analysis on the 128
authorized channels, and their associated recipes.
B. Initial Observations
We recorded authorization sessions (screenshot of OAuth
permissions prompt and authorization URL) for 128 channels
connected to our test IFTTT account. Based on this data,
we make initial observations about: (1) Permission prompt
descriptiveness and user control, and (2) OAuth token scopes.
• OAuth permission prompts serve as potential control
points for users to enforce fine-grained control over the
privilege that third parties gain. We analyzed whether
the permission prompt screens in our dataset offer fine-
grained control by manually interacting with the UI and
checking for options to modify the requested privilege.
Out of 128 channels we studied, the online services for
122 of those channels provide the user with an all-or-
nothing choice (authorizing the channel or not), even
though 106 of them have multiple triggers or actions. The
online services of 2 channels (Evernote and LinkedIn)
allow the user to select the time duration for the authoriza-
tion, and only 4 online services (AT&T M2X, Facebook,
Pushover, and SmartThings) provide fine-grained control
over data or devices that were being shared with IFTTT.
• OAuth permission prompts are an opportunity for online
services to explain the privilege that third parties are
requesting. We analyzed whether online services in our
dataset provide an adequate explanation of privilege by
comparing the description of the channels triggers and
actions with text in the prompt. Out of 128 channels,
only 76 of the corresponding online services provide an
adequate description of data that was being shared; 25
online services provide some description that is either
vague or insufficient in explaining their function to the
user; and 27 provide no information on data that was
being shared with the user.
Based on these measurements, we conclude that even
though online services provide some description of the privi-
lege that third parties like IFTTT request, they do not offer the
user control over those requests. This forces users to entrust
IFTTT with highly-privileged access to their devices and data,
thus increasing the risk they face if attackers compromise
IFTTT.
Next, we computed the average and median number of
triggers and actions for 297 channels. We find that channels
have on average 3.5 triggers per channel (median = 2), and an
average of 2 actions per channel (median = 1) with a long-tail
distribution (See Appendix B for a graph). As an IFTTT recipe
only uses a single trigger and a single action, most channels
exhibit recipe-channel overprivilege. However, if users create
recipes that involve all triggers and actions of all connected
channels, then this type of overprivilege does not exist any
more.
Finally, we determined the distribution of various OAuth
protocol variants in use. Out the set of 128 connected and
authorized channels, 113 online services that correspond to
these channels use OAuth 2.0, making it the most popular
variant (the remaining 8 use OAuth 1.0 and its variants, and we
could not determine the protocol being used for 7 channels due
to lack of information in the authorization sessions). Therefore,
we drilled down and analyzed the OAuth 2.0 scopes being
requested because they define the privilege an IFTTT channel
requests from the online service (§II).
Table III shows the breakdown of these scopes. Similar to
what we observe based on OAuth permissions prompts, we
see that 107 channels request a scope that is generic, null,
or simply specified as “ifttt”—clearly coarse-grained privilege
requests. Furthermore, due to IFTTT architecture, fault cannot
clearly be placed on IFTTT or on the online services since
a channel may be written by either IFTTT developers or the
online service provider. If an online service provider only has
coarse-grained tokens, then a channel only has the option to
request overprivileged access, irrespective of whether IFTTT
developers or the service provider creates the channel. We
also observe that only 21 online services out of 128 offer
fine-grained scoping. Table IV shows examples of fine-grained
scopes for channels in our dataset.
A significant fraction of the channels we study use fairly
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Scope ifttt null Generic Fine-Grained
Channels 77 26 4 21
TABLE III: 83% of online services do not provide fine-grained
scoping and only provide opaque scopes like generic, null, or
ifttt. We show examples of fine-grained scopes in Table IV.
Examples of generic scopes are “spark” or “app.”
Channel Allows UserControl Scope
AT&T M2X 3 IDENTITY, GET, POST
Facebook 3
manage notifications, manage pages,
public profile, publish actions,
user about me, user activities,
user events, user friends,
user location, user photos, user posts,
user status, user website
Netatmo Welcome 7 read camera, write camera
Pinterest 7
read public, write public, read secret,
write secret, read relationships,
write relationships
Youtube 7 https://www.googleapis.com/auth/youtube
TABLE IV: Examples of fine-grained scopes requested by
channels. 21 channels in total use fine-grained scopes when
requesting tokens. Only 4 online services that correspond to
these channels allow the user to exert control over them.
coarse-grained, opaque scopes. Therefore, we drilled down
further to determine the privilege these scopes represent, and
obtain a conservative lower bound on the overprivilege a
channel exhibits over a given online service in terms of
the APIs the online service exposes (channel-online-service
overprivilege). This involved examining in detail the set of
APIs a service provides. There are several challenges while
performing this analysis. We discuss them next.
C. Measuring Channel-Online-Service Overprivilege
The scope of the OAuth tokens IFTTT gains to operate
a channel defines the privilege that channel has over the
corresponding online service. As we discuss in §II, a channel
implements various triggers and actions. Each of the triggers
and actions will correspond to a set of one or more online
service APIs. For example, the Particle channel [22] from the
DIY electronics category provides triggers to monitor device
status and function results. It also provides actions to call
functions and to publish events. Ideally, the channel would
have privilege to only perform these triggers and actions.
However, due to the opaque nature of the scopes (see §III),
it is difficult to understand whether this is indeed the case.
Therefore, we measure the Channel-Online-Service over-
privilege on IFTTT. A channel exhibits such overprivilege
if it can access APIs that are not needed to implement its
triggers and actions. Given the opaque nature of the scopes, it
is not feasible to determine what APIs the channel can access
on the online service by simply reading the documentation.
Furthermore, many services do not document the scope-to-
API mapping. IFTTT is also closed source, and most online
services are closed source too, ruling out any source-code
inspection to determine the access control policy for a given
scope.
Our measurement strategy is to capture scoped tokens
identical to what IFTTT uses for a channel and then use those
tokens to exhaustively test the online service APIs to compute
the set of APIs the tokens give access to. We encountered the
following challenges while performing this measurement:
• IFTTT obtains the OAuth token for a channel using
server-to-server communication. This precludes the pos-
sibility of intercepting the tokens that IFTTT itself uses.
We verified that neither the IFTTT client side code
nor the IFTTT mobile app is directly involved in the
OAuth authorization workflow—all authorization occurs
on IFTTT’s back-end cloud service.
• Online services do not document their APIs in consistent
ways, making automated large scale testing difficult.
• The types of online service APIs are very diverse, making
it challenging to manually create input arguments. Fur-
thermore, online services generally do not provide any
unit tests with appropriate testing data, making it difficult
to distinguish input argument errors from permission
errors.
• Many online services have proprietary APIs that are only
exposed to IFTTT. There is no public information on these
APIs precluding any kind of measurement.
We built a semi-automated measurement pipeline that ad-
dresses all challenges to an extent, except the last one because
the online service did not provide any documentation.
Figure 5 shows our measurement tool’s architecture. It
takes as input an API specification database. We create this
database using two techniques: (1) Manual encoding of a
REST API into our database format and (2) Automated screen-
scraping of the online service’s API documentation if it is
sufficiently regular HTML. The automated step helps us partly
overcome the challenge of online services not documenting
their APIs in consistent ways.
The token generation step reads in the API specification
database and then creates a testing specification that includes
two types of tokens: (1) A valid token for the online service
and (2) An invalid token for the online service, mutated from
the valid token. Then the tool uses PyRestTest [30], an auto-
mated REST API testing tool to execute the test specification.
We use these two types of tokens to address the challenge of
distinguishing input argument errors from permission errors.
Since there is a large number of APIs and a large number of
online services, it is not possible to scalably create valid input
arguments for a given API. The only scalable and automated
option is to create randomized inputs. However, this leads
to API errors because these randomized arguments are often
not what the API expects to function correctly. Therefore, we
needed a reliable way to distinguish input validation errors
from permission errors. Furthermore, since the OAuth standard
does not mandate specific error codes for specific conditions,
it is often an implementation-dependent choice on what HTTP
error code to use. Therefore, our pipeline performs testing with
a known invalid token and with a known valid token. Then we
manually analyze the change in error code and error message
payload to decide whether the given valid token has permission
to access the API function in question or not.
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Fig. 5: Our semi-automated measurement pipeline to compute channel-online-service overprivilege. We use valid and invalid
tokens to distinguish input argument errors from authorization errors.
Token generation also overcomes the challenge of server-
to-server IFTTT authorization using four techniques:
• Scope Mirroring: A lot of channels use opaque scopes
like “ifttt” (Table III). Our strategy to analyze opaque
scopes is to create a mirror IFTTT-like application for a
particular online service and then request the same opaque
scope. This involves following the OAuth authorization
workflow manually which yields an identically scoped
token that IFTTT itself uses for that online service. In
the case where the online services do not have opaque
scopes, we observe that the scopes that IFTTT uses
can be expressed using the publicly available scopes.
Therefore, our strategy is to make our IFTTT mirror
application request the same public scopes that IFTTT
requests and to verify that the resulting OAuth permission
screen looks identical to the one we captured as part of the
authorization session in the data collection step (§III-A)
• Downgrade with Open Redirect: The OAuth 2.0 pro-
tocol supports two major authorization workflows: autho-
rization code grant and implicit grant. The authorization
code grant is the more secure option since it requires a
client secret that is never revealed to client-side code in
IFTTT’s case. However, we observe that many OAuth
implementations also support the implicit grant flow—
no client secret is required, and a third party can obtain
a token simply with a redirect from the authorization
server. Furthermore, the implicit grant is vulnerable to the
open redirector attack [24], where an attacker can replace
the redirect_uri component of the authorization
URL with an attacker controlled domain. Therefore, our
strategy is to attack our own test IFTTT accounts on
the online service by pretending to be an IFTTT-like
application and performing a downgrade attack with open
redirectors. The result is that we obtain an identically
scoped token to what IFTTT uses. For example, consider
the Ubi channel authorization URL:
http://portal.theubi.com/oauth/
authorize?client_id=REDACTED&redirect_
uri=https://ifttt.com/channels/ubi/
authorize&response_type=code&scope=
ifttt&state=VALUE
A downgrade attack URL would be of the form:
http://portal.theubi.com/oauth/
authorize?client_id=REDACTED&redirect_
uri=ATTACKER_URI&response_type=token&
scope=ifttt&state=VALUE
Notice the change in the redirect_uri parameter and
the response_type parameter.
• Downgrade only: This strategy is similar to the above,
except that the online service is vulnerable to a downgrade
attack but not vulnerable to an open redirector attack.
This prevents us from receiving the access token on an
attacker-controlled domain. Instead, we used a man-in-
the-browser attack to read the OAuth token.
Once our pipeline produces two API testing results—one
with a valid token and one with an invalid token, we manually
compare the outputs to produce a privilege mapping. This
mapping encodes whether the valid token has access to a given
API. The two API resting results make it trivial to observe the
change in error code and error message to determine whether
the API failed due to a permission error or due to a scoping
error.
Once we have a privilege mapping, we manually map
channel operations to online service APIs. This step involves
examining the documentation of the online service APIs and
the trigger/action documentation, followed by conservatively
determining whether a particular API can be used to implement
a trigger or action. Our goal here is to obtain a conservative
lower-bound on channel-online-service overprivilege. At the
end of this step, any API for which the token provides access,
but is not needed to implement any trigger/action for the
channel, is marked as an overprivileged API.
D. Channel-Online-Service Overprivilege Results
To compute overprivilege in depth, we applied our mea-
surement pipeline on 24 channels out of a total of 69 channels
that can be measured. Figure 6 shows a breakdown of our
channel-online-service overprivilege results. Our measurement
tool outputs a privilege mapping for 941 APIs across 24
channels. We then performed a manual overprivilege analysis
and observed that 18 channels exhibit overprivilege. These
overprivileged channels have access to an average of 26 API
functions that they do not need to implement the associated
trigger and action functionality. We also observed that 6 chan-
nels do not exhibit any overprivilege—they use all accessible
APIs to implement triggers and actions.
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Fig. 6: Number of API functions accessible to IFTTT channels
based on their privilege. 66.42% of API functions accessible
to IFTTT channels are not used in any trigger or action.
The channels we study in-depth cover 80.4%
(46, 354/57, 632) of all recipes involved in the set of
69 measurable channels. Our overprivilege results potentially
impact 86.5%(2, 389, 181/2, 760, 341) of all users of the
recipes associated with the channels that can be measured.3
Figure 7 shows the coverage we achieve in terms of the
recipes associated with the channels we measure and in terms
of the number of users of those recipes. We use number of
recipes associated with a channel and number of users of
those recipes as a metric that estimates channel adoption
and popularity. We note that the coverage CDF only shows
coverage for the top 8 channels sorted in terms of recipe
counts and user shares. Our actual coverage is slightly
higher than what the CDF shows since we also analyze
cyber-physical channels. Out of the total of 24 channels, we
studied all 16 cyber-physical channels that can be analyzed
in-depth—cyber-physical channels have the potential to create
a significant security risk since they are associated with
physical devices.
Based on our in-depth analysis of channel-online-service
overprivilege, we revisit our examples of potentially overpriv-
ileged channels here (initially discussed in §II-B) and confirm
that the Particle and Google Drive channels have access to
online service APIs that they do not need to implement their
sets of triggers and actions. Appendix A contains a complete
breakdown of overprivilege by channel.
IV. LESSONS & IMPLICATIONS OF THE EMPIRICAL
ANALYSIS
We highlight the lessons we extracted based on the results
of our empirical analysis of IFTTT’s authorization model.
• The channel abstraction strikes a good balance in
the usability-security trade-off, but results in highly-
privileged tokens residing inside IFTTT’s infrastructure.
Users sign in to online services only once per channel,
and IFTTT obtains an OAuth token that is sufficiently
privileged to execute all kinds of recipes it supports. If
tokens were recipe-specific, then the user would have
to sign in to the online services per recipe, thereby
3The recipe dataset contains the number of times a recipe was shared by
users [36].
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Fig. 7: A CDF of our overprivilege analysis coverage. We
study 8 of the top measurable channels counted in terms of
the number of associated recipes, and user shares of those
recipes. We also studied all 16 cyber-physical channels that
can be measured. Our overprivilege analysis covers 80.4% of
all recipes that are involved in the set of channels that can be
measured.
drastically increasing the number of prompts, leading to
prompt fatigue.
• Highly-privileged tokens inside IFTTT’s infrastructure are
a single point of failure, making it an attractive target
for attackers. If IFTTT is compromised and becomes
malicious, it can arbitrarily execute a wide variety of
functions on the user’s online services, as our empirical
analysis shows.
• Coarse-grained bearer tokens themselves are an attractive
target for attackers and are susceptible to known OAuth
attacks [14], [16]. We analyzed how many channels out of
297 are vulnerable to two types of OAuth attacks directed
at the user. We found that 4 channels are vulnerable to the
open redirector OAuth attack where a victim user can be
tricked into logging into the authentic online service page
but with an attacker-controlled redirect URI that would let
the attacker obtain an OAuth bearer token. This attack is
similar to that of Fernandes et al. [16]. We also found that
22 channels are vulnerable to downgrade-only attacks.
Although this attack requires a stronger assumption of a
man-in-the-browser, or HTTP-only communications (no
HTTPS), it still does highlight the risk that users might
face due to overprivileged channels on IFTTT.
Based on the above lessons, our goal is to provide trigger-
action functionality to end-users without increasing the number
of OAuth permission prompts, while preventing arbitrary mis-
use of OAuth tokens if IFTTT is compromised. We discuss
our design that achieves this goal in the next section.
Threat Model. We assume that the trigger-action platform can
be compromised. It can leak the OAuth bearer tokens and it
can attempt to invoke actions arbitrarily. It can also try to
manipulate the trigger data passing through its infrastructure.
For example, if we have a recipe that saves an Instagram image
to Dropbox, the untrusted trigger-action platform might instead
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save malware into the user’s Dropbox account. A compromised
trigger-action platform can leak trigger data that might be
privacy sensitive. We do not prevent such leaks. Currently,
the user has to trust the platform with access to data it needs
to run recipes. We discuss potential ways to overcome this
problem in §VII. We assume that online services use HTTPS
for their OAuth APIs,4 and that they are not compromised (if
an online service is compromised, then an attack is possible
independently of IFTTT). We consider denial of service attacks
to be outside the scope.
V. DECOUPLED-IFTTT DESIGN
Decoupled-IFTTT splits the logically monolithic IFTTT
architecture into a cloud service (dIFTTT-Cloud) that users do
not trust, and several clients (dIFTTT-Clients). The dIFTTT-
Cloud provides computational infrastructure to execute recipes
at large scale, like IFTTT’s cloud. We assume that it can
be compromised by attackers. We introduce extensions to the
OAuth protocol to ensure that the cloud service only has the
necessary amount of privilege to execute the set of recipes
of a given user. Each user must install a dIFTTT-Client on a
device such as a smartphone. Users connect channels to their
accounts and setup trigger-action recipes with the help of the
these clients. A user trusts a client to manage highly-privileged
access to their online services.
We designed the OAuth protocol extensions for dIFTTT
to be open allowing anyone to implement the client portion
of the protocol. Furthermore, the clients are not implemented
by the same entity implementing the untrusted cloud service.
Instead, we envision a community of developers building client
applications and hosting them at various market places, e.g.,
Android or Apple store. These app market models naturally re-
sult in a few well-built apps emerging, thus making it easy for
users to install relatively good and secure implementations of
the dIFTTT-Client. Furthermore, the open source community
can independently vet open source clients.
As is the case with IFTTT, there are two phases a user must
follow to create a recipe: Channel Connection, and Recipe
Setup. We will discuss how these two phases work, with the
help of an example recipe taken from IFTTT:
IF new_item added to ShoppingList THEN
email new_item to x@y.com
Channel Connection. A user will connect channels using
a client. To create the above recipe, the user will have to
first connect the ShoppingList and Email channels (assuming
they haven’t been connected before). This involves the usual
step of the user logging in to the services corresponding to
the channels with a username and password, and eventually
accepting the OAuth scopes being requested. During this
standard OAuth negotiation (we only use authorization code
grant flow), the dIFTTT-Client requests an XToken (Transfer
Token, see Figure 8). An XToken is coarse-grained and can
only be used to obtain recipe-specific tokens without creating
a permission prompt. As these tokens are highly-privileged
(because they allow the bearer to obtain a recipe-specific token
for any of the functions a particular online service provides),
4Out of 297 channels, only 2 used HTTP; all others used HTTPS.
we encrypt their storage when they are not in main memory.
The dIFTTT-Client can also use a trusted-hardware-backed
keystore when available on a client (§VI). We introduce the
notion of an XToken to maintain the usability experience of
one-time authorizations of channels, and to gain the security
of recipe-specific tokens.
Recipe Setup. Once the user has connected the trigger and
action channels, the next step is to setup the trigger part of the
recipe. This involves navigating a UI and eventually clicking
on one of the trigger functions that the channel offers. In this
case, OnNewItem is a function that fires whenever a new item
is added to the user’s shopping list. dIFTTT-Client will treat
the physical act of the user clicking a specific trigger function
in the UI as an implicit authorization for it to obtain a recipe-
specific token that can only execute OnNewItem. It transmits
the XToken it obtained earlier to the trigger online service
including information about the specific function for which it
wants a recipe-specific token. As a return value, the trigger
service will also transmit its X509 certificate to the client, in
addition to the recipe-specific token (Figure 8).
A recipe-specific token only allows the bearer to exe-
cute a single function with specific parameters on an on-
line service. For example, assume that the ShoppingList
service offers two functions that external parties may call:
test(), and OnNewItem(String URL). The XToken
allows the bearer to obtain a recipe-specific token for any
of these supported functions. In our example recipe, an ex-
ternal party only needs to call OnNewItem with a String
value of “https://difttt-cloud.com/new item.” Therefore, the
client can obtain a recipe-specific token scoped to only exe-
cute OnNewItem(‘https://difttt-cloud.com/new item’). That is,
a scope in dIFTTT is equivalent to the name of a function in
an online service.
Our design relies on two principles to overcome the chal-
lenge of an increased number of prompts while using such
fine-grained tokens:
• The user authorizes the client to obtain an XToken when
a channel is connected. This does not change the number
of permission prompts for a user—it is the same as
IFTTT. The XToken has the property of allowing the
client to obtain a recipe-specific token without creating
a permission prompt, as the user has already given the
client that amount of privilege by authorizing it to obtain
an XToken.
• The client only uses the XToken upon an explicit user
interaction. This notion is directly inspired by User-
Driven Access Control [29].
Setting up the action part of the recipe is similar to
setting up the trigger part. The user will navigate a UI and
implicitly authorize the client to obtain a recipe-specific token
to invoke a particular action function. However, the token
exchange process is slightly different. As Figure 8 shows, the
dIFTTT-Client will transmit the action XToken, the trigger
service’s X509 certificate, the name of the trigger function
(OnNewItem), the action function name (send_email), and
any action function parameters to the action service. The action
service will return a recipe-specific token and associate all of
this information with that token internally, effectively tying the
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issued token to a particular triggering function and a particular
action function.
At this point, the dIFTTT-Client has obtained two recipe-
specific tokens needed to execute the recipe. It transmits these
tokens along with a description of the recipe to dIFTTT-
Cloud that uses the trigger token to set up a callback to
itself whenever the trigger condition (i.e., new item added to
shopping list) occurs.
Channel Signup. Currently, IFTTT knows which scopes to re-
quest for various trigger and action functions because channels
store that scope-to-function mapping in IFTTT’s infrastructure.
However, in our case, this infrastructure is untrusted. dIFTTT-
Cloud could manipulate scope-to-function mappings to trick
the clients into requesting the wrong scopes. Our design solves
this problem by requiring the online services to create a signed
scope-to-function mapping and host those mappings at a well-
known location. An online service signs its mapping using the
private key corresponding to its X509 certificate. The clients
retrieve these signed mappings during the channel signup phase
(Figure 8).
Recipe Execution. At runtime, whenever a new item is added
to the shopping list, the trigger service will generate an HTTP
call to the IFTTT cloud and pass the trigger data (in our
example recipe, this will be the item that was added to
the shopping list). dIFTTT changes this process slightly, and
instead requires the trigger service to generate a trigger blob
(see Figure 9):
[Time, TTL, TriggerScope, TriggerData, SIG]
where SIG is a digital signature of a concatenation of
the other data items. The public key of this signing private
key was transmitted to the action service as part of the setup
process. Time is the timestamp when the blob was created,
and TTL specifies the period for which the blob is valid. Once
the trigger service creates this blob, it will transmit it to the
dIFTTT-Cloud. At that point, the dIFTTT-Cloud will lookup
the appropriate recipe, and then invoke the action function
using the recipe-specific token it obtained earlier.
Upon receiving the HTTP call from the dIFTTT-Cloud,
the action service will first execute a lightweight verification
process before invoking the target function. The verification
steps are:
• Verify that the passed recipe-specific token exists.
• Verify the signature on the trigger blob using the X509
certificate of the triggering service.
◦ Ensure that the time stamp value has increased.
◦ Verify that the Time-To-Live (TTL) value inside the
trigger blob is current.
◦ Check that the trigger scope (function name) inside the
blob matches what the action service was given during
the setup phase.
• Verify that the HTTP function being called at runtime is
the same as the function name given by the trusted client
to the action service during the setup phase.
• Finally, verify that the function parameters match those
that the trusted client gave the action service during the
setup phase.
If all verification checks succeed, then the action service
proceeds normally and executes the send_email function.
We note that the recipe execution process does not depend
on the dIFTTT-Client, as recipe-specific tokens are already
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uploaded to dIFTTT-Cloud.
A. Security Properties of our Decoupled Design
The above design ensures that the dIFTTT-Cloud can only
execute user recipes whenever a trigger occurs, even if it is
compromised. Here, we explain in more detail how the various
components of our OAuth protocol additions and decoupled
design provide this guarantee.
Action Misuse Resistance. An untrusted or compromised
IFTTT cloud can invoke action functions at will, even in the
absence of any triggers. Furthermore, based on our empirical
study results, it could invoke a wide variety of functions
given the rampant overprivilege. dIFTTT prevents all of these
problems. First, although XTokens are coarse-grained, they are
never transmitted to the untrusted cloud service. Only recipe-
specific tokens that can execute a single function with specific
parameters are transmitted to the dIFTTT-Cloud. Furthermore,
the dIFTTT-Cloud can successfully execute an action function
only if it can prove that a trigger occurred within some
reasonable amount of time in the past. The signed trigger blob
provides this property.
Trigger Misuse Resistance. dIFTTT-Cloud could try to mis-
use the trigger blob and attempt replay attacks. However,
the time stamp and time-to-live value ensures trigger blob
freshness. It could also try to use a trigger blob from another
trigger service or the trigger blob of a different trigger function
on the same service. However, while setting up the recipe, the
trusted dIFTTT-Client instructs the action service to associate
the name of the trigger scope (function name) with the action
token. Furthermore, the signed trigger blob contains this trigger
scope. Therefore, dIFTTT-Cloud can only use a given trigger
blob for a specific action function. In other words, the dIFTTT-
Cloud can only execute the user’s recipe.
Trigger Data Integrity. The untrusted dIFTTT-Cloud may
attempt to modify the data it receives from the triggering
service before delivering it to the action service. An example
of this would be a recipe that saves new images from an
Instagram channel to a Dropbox account. An attacker may
replace the image with malware before uploading the file to
Dropbox. dIFTTT protects against such an attack by requiring
the trigger service to sign the fields of the trigger blob with its
private key. When receiving the trigger blob, the action service
verifies the signature using the public key that was associated
with the action token during recipe setup.
Recipe Deletion. A user can delete recipes with the help of
dIFTTT-Client, that will issue a recipe deletion HTTP API
call to the online services involved in a specific recipe. The
online services will then invalidate the recipe-specific tokens.
A malicious dIFTTT-Cloud can retain the recipe description,
but it won’t be able to execute any trigger or action functions
because the online services will automatically refuse the HTTP
calls as the tokens no longer exist.
No Single Point of Failure. Although the XToken is coarse-
grained, it is never transmitted to the untrusted cloud service.
Thus, the attacker has to target and compromise individual
devices to obtain the XToken. Therefore, these tokens are not
a single point of failure any more.
B. Usability Properties of our Decoupled Design
From an end-user perspective, dIFTTT retains the concept
of the one-time operation of users connecting channels to their
accounts. However, as users have to use a client app, it does
limit their mobility (see §VII for options to increase mobil-
ity). dIFTTT does not add any additional OAuth prompts—it
leverages User-Driven Access Control to automatically obtain
the recipe-specific tokens.
As we discussed in §III-B, online services in general
do not provide with users fine-grained control over OAuth
permissions and do not provide good descriptions of the
permissions being requested. However, dIFTTT enables fine-
grained control and good descriptiveness. When a dIFTTT-
Client requests the user’s permission to obtain an XToken, it
can directly list the set of online service functions for which
the XToken can be used to gain access. Furthermore, the
online service can provide an option for users to select the
set of functions they wish to include in the XToken—dIFTTT-
Client will not be able to obtain recipe-specific tokens for any
functions not in that set.
From a developer perspective, dIFTTT requires changes.
Specifically, it requires adding code to implement XTokens,
the recipe-specific tokens, trigger blob generation, and the
verification procedure. This can be a barrier to immediate
adoption. However, as we discuss in §VI, §VII, we have
implemented dIFTTT in a way to ease the transition for online
service developers by only requiring them to add a single
annotation above HTTP methods in the server.
C. Expressivity of Decoupled-IFTTT
For services that do not natively support a callback in-
terface for a specific triggering condition, the trigger-action
platform must poll the service and check the triggering condi-
tion itself. For example, a weather channel might only offer an
API that returns the current temperature. To support a trigger
that fires if the temperature goes above 80 degrees, IFTTT
would poll the weather service and compute the predicate
currTemp > 80. However, the dIFTTT-Cloud might simply
ignore the result of the comparison, and invoke the action
service repeatedly. The verification on the action end will
succeed since dIFTTT-Cloud will obtain a valid signed trigger
blob when it polls the trigger service.
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dIFTTT handles such situations by allowing the client to
associate a predicate with the action token. This predicate is
expressed over fields of the trigger data part of the signed
trigger blob. The dIFTTT-Client simply maps the condition the
user sets up while creating the recipe to a predicate and then
instructs the action service to associate the predicate with the
resulting recipe-specific token. At runtime, the action service
performs the additional step of verifying that the predicate is
true.
Encoding such stateless predicates handles a significant
fraction of the kinds of conditions that IFTTT supports. We
studied the triggers, actions, and online service APIs for 24
channels that covered 80.4% of recipes in our dataset and did
not find any predicates that required storing state. We also
studied the Zapier channel creation process but did not find
any resources for channels to keep state [12]. Moreover, all
Zapier predicates only involve simple boolean operators. Our
prototype fully supports expressing such recipes.
VI. IMPLEMENTATION & EVALUATION
We implemented dIFTTT-Client on the Android platform.
For additional client-side security, the dIFTTT-Client will use
a hardware-backed keystore, when available, to generate a key
that we use to encrypt XTokens before storing them on the
filesystem. Such keystores have been present in iOS devices
since 2013 [13] and have been supported in Android devices
since version 6.0 [26].
We built a Python library that online service developers
can use to add dIFTTT functionality. The library provides
a simple annotation (i.e., Python decorator) that developers
can place above sensitive HTTP API methods that require
recipe-specific scoping. The annotation automatically invokes
the verification procedure (see §V). Using the Python library,
we implemented the dIFTTT-Cloud, and two online services
modeled after existing IFTTT channels: (1) an Amazon Alexa
inspired ToDo list, (2) an email service.
A. Microbenchmarks
We first quantified micro-performance factors of dIFTTT.
We created the following recipe: “IF new item == ‘buy
soap’ is added to MyToDo List THEN send email(new item).”
That is, if a new ToDo item with contents “buy soap” is added
to the list, then send an email. This recipe is representative
of the kinds of recipes that users can create on IFTTT. It
contains all the elements of typical recipes: a condition on data
coming from the trigger service, and transfer of trigger service
data to an action service function. We deployed dIFTTT
locally, created the example recipe, and then measured storage
overhead, transmission overhead, and developer effort.5 We
found that using dIFTTT imposes negligible overhead: Each
recipe requires an additional 3.5KB in terms of storage, and
an additional 7.5KB of transmission per execution. Online
service developers using our prototype library only need to
add a single line of code per HTTP API function—this is
the same as that required by the popular oauthlib library for
Python. We elaborate on the results below.
5For microbenchmarks, deployment location does not affect the quantities
under study.
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Fig. 10: Average total transmission size of IFTTT and dIFTTT
for 1 − 10 parameters for 5 experiments. Although there is a
linear increasing trend in both systems, the difference among
the two remains negligible.
Storage Overhead. Using dIFTTT requires online services
to store additional state: An online service needs to store an
XToken for each trusted client that allows the client to create
fine-grained tokens for individual recipes. The online service
also needs to store dIFTTT fine-grained tokens for each recipe.
These tokens include additional fields (e.g., time, TTL), so they
impose storage overhead on the online service. We computed
the required storage for the baseline IFTTT system, and for
dIFTTT. Our results show that each dIFTTT recipe creates a
3.5KB overhead in addition to the 0.8KB required to store the
XToken, compared to the 0.8KB storage cost for the baseline
IFTTT system. This extra token storage cost is negligible given
the low price of storage and quantity of other user data that
these systems collect.
Transmission Overhead. Executing a recipe on dIFTTT re-
quires transmitting more data over the network. This overhead
is the result of additional data in the trigger blob (Figure 9)
including time, TTL, and sign. To evaluate the transmission
overhead, we computed the transmission size of recipe ex-
ecution in the baseline case and compared it to the same
quantity in the dIFTTT case. We varied the number of function
parameters passed (1−10) and present the average result of five
experiments. The number of function parameters matters be-
cause the recipe-specific token information encodes data about
the specific function being executed. We used Wireshark [11]
to measure the flow sizes associated with ports assigned to
online services and the dIFTTT-Cloud. Figure 10 presents this
overhead for different number of function parameters for the
two systems. In our experiments, dIFTTT created 6 − 11%
overhead. Even when using 10 parameters the transmission
overhead does not exceed 7.5KB.
Developer Effort. We developed dIFTTT as a library for
trigger and action services to make it easy for online service
developers to transition to the dIFTTT model. Developers
must only add a single additional line of code per function
to protect it with dIFTTT verifications. When compared to
existing OAuth libraries, such as the popular oauthlib [8], this
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Fig. 11: dIFTTT adds less than 15ms of verification latency to
recipe execution when compared to the baseline IFTTT case.
is the same amount of effort—developers using oauthlib must
also place a single annotation above HTTP API methods to
create scopes.
B. Macrobenchmarks
We measured end-to-end latency and throughput of recipe
execution. We hosted the dIFTTT-Cloud and two online
services on separate Amazon t2.micro EC2 instances. Each
instance was configured with one 64-bit Intel Xeon Family
vCPU@2.5 GHz, 1GB memory, 8GB SSD storage, Ubuntu
14.04 with Apache2, and MySQL Server 5.5. Our results show
a modest 15ms latency increase, and 2.5% throughput drop
in the online service when compared to the baseline (online
service with no dIFTTT protections). This does not represent
an inhibiting overhead for an online service especially when
considering the effect of network latency and the lack of real-
time requirements in these systems. We used the same ToDo
list recipe for our tests.
End-to-End Latency. We measured the time between the
trigger service being activated due to an item being added
to our ToDo list example recipe, and the time the action
service issues a send_email call. This time includes net-
work latency, the time to generate a signed trigger blob, and
the time to verify the trigger blob and the action token, in
the case of dIFTTT. Our baseline case is the IFTTT system,
and it only includes network latency, and time to execute the
trigger and action functions without any dIFTTT verification.
We varied the number of function parameters on the action
service between 1 and 10. Figure 11 presents the results of
these experiments. Our results show that excluding the network
latency, the maximum verification overhead is less than 15ms.
For typical recipes, that send emails, SMSs, or invoke actions
on physical devices over a network, we consider this additional
latency to be acceptable.
Throughput. We measure throughput as the number of recipes
executed per second, under a load of 2000 concurrent HTTP re-
quests. We computed this concurrency level by examining the
number of times the most popular IFTTT channel was used in
recipes (IF Notification channel was used in 1, 514, 188 recipes
in our dataset). As per IFTTT’s documentation, this channel
will contact an online service once every 15 minutes [6],
dIFTTT IFTTT
Avg SD Avg SD
Throughput (req/sec) 94.03 8.48 96.46 5.74
TABLE V: dIFTTT reduces throughput by 2.5% when com-
pared to IFTTT. We used ApacheBench to send 10, 000 trigger
activations with upto 2000 concurrent activations at a time.
meaning that an online service would receive approximately
1, 682 requests/second. Therefore, we chose 2000 as an
upper-bound for the number of concurrent requests a service
would have to process. We used ApacheBench [2] to conduct
throughput testing of dIFTTT and IFTTT by sending 10, 000
trigger activations with upto 2000 concurrent activations at a
time. Table V presents our results, averaged over three separate
runs. We find that dIFTTT decreases throughput by only 2.5%.
VII. DISCUSSION
Transitioning to dIFTTT. Our design has the limitation of
requiring changes in online services to support the recipe-
specific tokens and the cryptographic extensions to the OAuth
2.0 protocol. This can be a barrier to immediate adoption.
We ease this transition by modeling our implementation after
the popular oauthlib [8] where developers only have to add
a single-line annotation above HTTP methods in the server
that need to be protected by recipe-specific tokens. A short-
term option is to also construct a trusted proxy or shim around
online services that adds dIFTTT support. In this case, users
would login to the proxy instead of the online service, and
only the proxy is dIFTTT-aware. Once online services have
added dIFTTT support, the trusted proxy can be removed.
dIFTTT-Client use. In IFTTT, users can login to the IFTTT
website and create recipes from any client device. However,
dIFTTT requires users to create recipes via a client device
they trust (e.g., their smartphone), which stores XTokens in
a private file system. Although our current client prototype
does not support transferring client state from one device to
another, building such functionality is fairly straightforward.
One possible solution is to provide an export function to save
the current client state to a disk image, and then provide an
import function to load that client state into another device.
If a client device is lost, then user recipes continue to exe-
cute normally. However, the user will have to download the
client again on another device, and go through the channel
connection phase to re-establish the XTokens to create future
recipes.
Other potential solutions to reduce the negative impact
of overprivilege. One option is for online services to issue
OAuth tokens that must be refreshed frequently. If the trigger-
action platform is compromised, the online services can simply
stop processing refresh requests from IFTTT. This technique
reduces the useful attack window to the refresh interval plus
the time it takes for the knowledge that the platform was
compromised to propagate to the online services. This so-
lution requires detecting a compromise in a timely fashion.
Furthermore, such a design does not reduce the privilege of
the trigger-action platform—it still remains an attractive target.
Another solution is to use OAuth 1.0 tokens because these
are not immediately useful to attackers if they are stolen in
isolation. It requires stealing the shared signing secret as well.
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However, if the trigger-action platform is compromised, then
the attacker gains access to the signing key as well.
Client-Device Loss. If a client device is lost, existing proce-
dures to erase device data take care of removing OAuth tokens.
Also, an “erasure-app” can be built to automatically contact
online services and invalidate tokens with co-operation from
our modified OAuth helper library. We leave implementing this
to future work.
Data confidentiality. Our design currently reduces the priv-
ilege of the dIFTTT-Cloud—it only gains access to APIs
and hence data it needs to run the user’s recipes. This is
an improvement over the current state-of-the-art where we
have shown through our empirical analysis that an attacker
can gain wide access to data and devices. However, even with
our improvements, an attacker can still gain access to sensitive
information simply by passively recording recipe execution. A
potential way to provide data confidentiality in this case is
to encrypt data passing through the dIFTTT-Cloud. However,
this can result in a loss of expressivity. Currently, IFTTT can
evaluate predicates on trigger data (see our weather data exam-
ple in §V-C). Although the action service can solely evaluate
these predicates, it does increase computational burden, thus
defeating the purpose of a system like IFTTT. As our analysis
shows, the predicates are stateless and involve simple compar-
ison operators. Therefore, a potential solution is to leverage
advancements in use-case-specific homomorphic encryption
for secure integer comparison, rule matching, etc., to allow
the least-privilege dIFTTT-Cloud to evaluate predicates on
encrypted data [27], [34]. We leave this to future work.
VIII. RELATED WORK
Trigger-Action Platform Studies. A few studies have inves-
tigated IFTTT in recent years, although in different contexts.
Ur et al. [36] crawled the site in 2015, collecting 224,590
IFTTT programs shared by over 100,000 different users. Their
study shows many interesting statistics including the number
of different trigger and action channels used by IFTTT users.
In contrast, we conduct an empirical overprivilege analysis of
how channels interact with the corresponding online services.
Poirot is a security analysis tool that finds vulnerabilities in
systems that occur due to discrepancies between a designer’s
view of a system and that of an attacker [25]. The authors apply
Poirot to IFTTT as a case study and find a previously unknown
login CSRF based attack where data from one user account can
be written to another unrelated attacker account. In contrast,
we assume that the IFTTT platform can be compromised,
and introduce a decoupled design where the cloud component
executes recipes at scale and is untrusted. dIFTTT ensures that
if the cloud component is compromised, the attacker cannot
arbitrarily invoke actions. Instead, it can only invoke actions
if it can prove trigger occurrence.
TrigGen is a tool that aims to avoid errors caused by
users incorrectly creating rules that have insufficient triggering
conditions [28]. Our work is not focused on recipe correctness.
We study the security of the way that IFTTT interacts with
online services.
OAuth Security Analyses. Since the Open standard for Au-
thorization (OAuth) debuted in 2007 [23], a number of studies
discovered flaws in the protocol and the way the protocol was
implemented in web sites [7], [17], [19], [20], [31], [32], [35],
[39]–[41]. Nonetheless, the OAuth protocol is still popular
and it is now commonly used in mobile applications as well.
Since the protocol was initially designed for web sites, some
of the important details of the protocol was up to developers’
interpretation when adapting OAuth to a mobile application.
Recent work scrutinized implementations of OAuth in
many Android mobile applications [14], [33], [38], showing
that the majority of implementations were vulnerable [14],
[38]. In the context of analyzing the security of the Smart-
Things smart home app platform, Fernandes et al. [16] showed
that a third-party Android application embedded a client ID
and the secret needed to authenticate the relying party in
the application binary, allowing an impersonation attack and
injecting a backdoor pin code to a doorlock as a result.
Our work is an addition to this growing list of work
discovering vulnerabilities associated with implementing the
OAuth protocol. However, our focus is to understand over-
privilege granted to IFTTT independently of an online service
implementing the protocol securely, and then design defenses.
The OAuth related vulnerability that we discovered for several
online services simply makes the attack easier and more widely
applicable. Beside vulnerabilities in implementation, other
attacks on trigger-action platforms may also expose user data
to attackers. Massive data leaks are happening with increasing
commonality. Target [9], Ashley Madison [10], and US voters
database [1] are some of the most recent examples of such
high profile leaks. Our work introduces the first decoupled
trigger-action platform design with the security property of
only allowing the attacker who compromises the platform to
execute specific user recipes.
Fett et al. conducted a formal security analysis of the
OAuth 2.0 standard, and in the process discovered new vul-
nerabilities [18]. They also propose fixes and then prove the
security of the protocol in an expressive web model. These
contributions are orthogonal to ours and our work will benefit
from their fixes to the OAuth protocol.
Cloud Platform Compromise. Beside vulnerabilities in
OAuth implementation, other attacks on trigger-action plat-
forms may also expose user data to attackers. Massive data
leaks are commonplace. Target [9], Ashley Madison [10], and
US voters database [1] are some of the most recent examples
of such high profile leaks. Our work introduces the first
decentralized trigger-action platform design with the security
property of only allowing the attacker who compromises the
platform to execute specific user rules.
IX. CONCLUSIONS
Trigger-Action platforms enable users to stitch together
various online services that represent data and physical devices
to achieve useful automation. These platforms work by gaining
privilege to access user data and devices in the form of OAuth
tokens. These systems pose a long-term security risk—if they
are ever compromised, attackers can use these tokens to arbi-
trarily manipulate data and devices. In this work, we performed
the first measurement study aimed at quantifying the risk users
face in the event of a compromise. We studied the authorization
model of If-This-Then-That (IFTTT), a platform with wide
15
support for user data and devices with an active and large user
community. Using semi-automated measurement tools that we
built, we analyzed 24 channels, including 16 cyber-physical
channels, and achieved a coverage of 80.4% of all recipes
associated with the set of 69 measurable channels. We found
that 18/24 channels have access to online service APIs that
they do not need to implement their triggers and actions. To
demonstrate the abilities of an attacker, we used overprivileged
tokens to reprogram a Particle chip’s firmware and delete a
user’s Google Drive files. More generally, we conclude that
attackers can misuse tokens to arbitrarily manipulate devices
and data in current trigger-action platforms.
Motivated by these findings, we designed, built and eval-
uated dIFTTT, the first decoupled trigger-action platform that
provides trigger-action functionality without the corresponding
long-term security risks. dIFTTT splits the logically monolithic
IFTTT architecture into an untrusted cloud service and a set
of clients for users. We introduced the concept of recipe-
specific tokens that, upon verification, guarantee that the recipe
was executed correctly on valid trigger inputs. Recipe-specific
tokens guarantee that even in the event of a total compromise
of the cloud service, it cannot cause unauthorized actions to
be executed on an action channel. We also introduced the
notion of the Transfer Token (XToken), and apply it to achieve
the security of recipe-specific tokens without increasing the
number of authorization prompts for users, when compared
to IFTTT. We built a Python library that online service
developers can use to add dIFTTT support with a single-
line annotation. We conducted a range of micro- and macro-
benchmarks to establish that dIFTTT poses modest overhead:
an additional 15ms latency in executing a recipe end-to-end,
and a 2.5% throughput drop while servicing 2000 concurrent
trigger activations.
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APPENDIX A: AN IN-DEPTH LOOK AT OVERPRIVILEGE
Table VII shows a detailed breakdown for the in-depth
measurement study of overprivilege. Table VI shows example
overprivileged APIs that IFTTT can access.
Particle. Our API testing reveals that the Particle IFTTT
channel has the ability to flash new firmware to a chip.
We used a token with scope=ifttt, which is identical to
what the Particle IFTTT channel requests, and reprogrammed
a chip by simply using a REST API call to confirm this.
This can completely change the functionality of the Particle
chips and cause a variety of security and safety issues if the
corresponding token is stolen. We also observe that the Particle
OAuth prompt only provides the user with a binary choice of
either approving or denying the permission request.
Google Drive. Our API testing reveals that the Google Drive
IFTTT channel has the ability to delete a user’s files. We
confirmed this behavior by using a token with the same
scope as what the Google Drive IFTTT channel requests.
This can cause data loss if the corresponding token is stolen.
We observe that the Google Drive channel requests multiple
scopes. However, the OAuth prompt only provides the user
with a binary choice of either approving or denying the request.
We also study the following channels’ overprivilege results
in detail, in addition to the above:
Facebook. This channel can post status messages and upload
photos. However, our API testing reveals that the channel
has overprivileged access to the Facebook API that allows it
to delete likes on various types of objects and also initiate
refunds. This can lead to potential financial issues. This
channel requests relatively fine-grained scopes, and the cor-
responding OAuth permissions prompt allows users to modify
the requested permissions.
Twitter. This channel can post tweets on behalf of the user,
can send direct messages, and update the biography page.
However, our API testing reveals that the channel has over-
privileged access to the Twitter API that allows it to delete
tweets, retweet other tweets, delete direct messages, follow
friends, delete friends, and even update the profile banner.
This can cause data loss and even profile defacement if the
corresponding token in stolen. We also observe that Twitter’s
REST API is based on OAuth 1.0 and therefore there is no
scope argument to the authorization URL. The permissions
are set up in the developer app console. Furthermore, the
Twitter OAuth prompt only provides a binary choice to the user
while requesting authorization—either approve all requested
permissions, or deny the request.
Dropbox. This channel provides actions to add new files to a
user’s account or to append to existing files. However, our API
testing reveals that the channel has overprivileged access to the
Dropbox API that allows it to delete files, change file sharing
settings, and even create file sharing links. This can cause data
loss and leakages if the corresponding token is stolen. We
also observe that the Dropbox channel does not use a scope
argument in the OAuth authorization URL. The permissions
are set in the developer app console. Furthermore, the Dropbox
OAuth prompt only provides the user with a binary choice—
either approve all requested permissions, or deny the request
with no way to customize the granted permissions.
MyFox Home Control. This channel can arm or disarm the
MyFox security system. However, our API testing reveals that
the channel has overprivileged access to the MyFox Home
Control API that allows it to stop live video recording, turn
on/off electric devices, and change the state of the heaters. This
can result in security breaches, overheating and large utility
bills if the corresponding token is stolen. We also observe that
MyFox Home Control does not provide any kind of scoped
access. This forces the channel to request complete access
to the API. Furthermore, the MyFox Home Control OAuth
prompt only provides a binary choice during authorization—
either approve all requested permissions, or deny the request.
Ubi. This smart home channel can trigger whenever there is
spoken command and it can speak announcements. However,
our API testing reveals that the channel has overprivileged
access to the Ubi API that allows it to also send speech
commands, get the geo-location of the device, and get a list
of all authenticated Ubis for a user. These overprivileged APIs
can enable an attacker to send commands to the Ubi device
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Channel Example Overprivileged APIs Description
Facebook https://graph.facebook.com/v2.7/from.id status-id Updates status that was posted by the
app itself
https://graph.facebook.com/v2.7/object-id/likes Deletes likes
https://graph.facebook.com/v2.7/payment-id/refunds WITH BODY currency=USD&amount=value Initiates a refund
Twitter https://api.twitter.com/1.1/statuses/destroy/240854986559455234.json Deletes a status message
https://api.twitter.com/1.1/statuses/retweet/241259202004267009.json Re-tweets a message
https://api.twitter.com/1.1/account/update profile banner.json?width=1500&height=500&offset top=0&
offset left=0&banner=FILE DATA
Updates profile banner
Dropbox https://api.dropboxapi.com/2/files/delete Deletes a file
https://api.dropboxapi.com/2/sharing/add file member Shares a file with a member
https://api.dropboxapi.com/2/sharing/create shared link Creates a file sharing link
Google Drive https://www.googleapis.com/drive/v3/files/file-id Deletes a file
https://www.googleapis.com/drive/v3/files/file-id/permissions Creates a permission for a file
https://www.googleapis.com/drive/v3/files/file-id/revisions/rev-id Permanently deletes a revision of a file
Particle https://api.particle.io/v1/devices/device-id Flashes a device with a pre-compiled
binary
https://api.particle.io/v1/devices/device-id Unclaims a device
https://api.particle.io/v1/devices/device-id WITH BODY name=new name Renames a device
MyFox Home Control https://api.myfox.me:443/v2/site/site-id/device/cam-id/camera/recording/stop Stops camera recording
https://api.myfox.me:443/v2/site/site-id/device/dev-id/heater/on Sets heater to ‘on’ mode
https://api.myfox.me:443/v2/site/site-id/device/dev-id/socket/on or /off Turns a device on or off
Ubi https://portal.theubi.com/v2/ubi/list Lists all connected Ubi devices
https://portal.theubi.com/v2/ubi/ubi-id/speech?phrase=hello Sends a speech command
https://portal.theubi.com/v2/ubi/ubi-id/location Returns geo-location of the Ubi
Google Glass https://www.googleapis.com/mirror/v1/locations Gets a location that is associated with a
timeline item
https://www.googleapis.com/mirror/v1/timeline/id Deletes a timeline item
https://www.googleapis.com/mirror/v1/contacts Gets all contacts
TABLE VI: Examples of overprivileged APIs channels can access that are not used in any of their triggers or actions.
causing security and safety issues. We find that this online
service provides the opaque scope=ifttt and provides an
all-or-nothing choice to the user when a channel requests
privilege. Furthermore, the Ubi online service is vulnerable
to the downgrade-with-open-redirect attack.
Google Glass. This popular wearable-category channel can
send a notification to the Glass device. However, our API
testing reveals that the channel has overprivileged access to the
Glass API that allows it to get all user contacts, delete timeline
items, and get locations associated with timeline items. This
can result in data loss or data leakage. We find that this online
service provides fine-grained scopes, but surfaces an all-or-
nothing OAuth prompt to the user.
APPENDIX B: DISTRIBUTION OF TRIGGERS AND ACTIONS
IN IFTTT CHANNELS
Figure 12 shows a distribution of the number of triggers
and actions per channel in IFTTT.
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Channel Triggers Actions Total APIs Overpriv. APIs Not overpriv. APIs Unknown Access Measurement Strategy
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s Facebook 10 3 217 172 18 27 scope-mirroring
Twitter 10 6 92 72 16 4 scope-mirroring
Dropbox 2 3 81 61 16 4 scope-mirroring
Gmail 6 1 56 37 7 12 scope-mirroring
Google Calendar 3 1 37 33 4 0 scope-mirroring
YouTube 3 0 50 31 5 14 scope-mirroring
Google Drive 0 4 34 31 3 0 scope-mirroring
Pocket 4 1 13 9 4 0 scope-mirroring
C
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MyFoxHomeControl 5 4 72 61 9 2 scope-mirroring
ATT M2X 3 3 93 34 12 47 scope-mirroring
Google Glass 0 1 22 19 2 1 downgrade
Camio 3 4 27 17 3 7 scope-mirroring
Particle 4 2 34 15 6 13 actual-ifttt-token
Recon 0 1 21 15 0 6 scope-mirroring
UPByJawbone 13 4 46 11 12 23 scope-mirroring
Ubi 1 1 6 3 3 0 downgrade-open-redirect
Pavlok 0 4 20 2 9 9 downgrade
Netatmo Welcome 9 0 8 2 3 3 downgrade-open-redirect
Netatmo Thermostat 6 8 6 0 5 1 scope-mirroring
Netatmo Weather Station 17 0 2 0 1 1 scope-mirroring
Nest Thermostat 4 3 1 0 1 0 scope-mirroring
Nest Protect 5 0 1 0 1 0 scope-mirroring
Nest Cam 3 0 1 0 1 0 scope-mirroring
LaMetric 1 1 1 0 1 0 downgrade-open-redirect
TABLE VII: Channel-Online-Service overprivilege results detail. Only 6 of the 24 did not have overprivileged access to online
service APIs. actual-ifttt-token means that we were able to obtain the token that IFTTT itself was using through an
administrative API.
19
